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Example of Additional Requirements

Requested by Mr. Siscoe

The pattern of Soviet Bloc arms sales in the Middle Eastern countries. New arms or obsolescent ones?

Soviet economic assistance; Soviet commercial interests and arms; Soviet shipping, banks, trade, etc.

Requested by Col. Nichols

Soviet influence through military assistance.

A summary of Iranian politico-military developments affecting the Iranian acquisition of Soviet arms.

What were the shifts which brought Iran to its present position of obtaining arms from the USSR and the US?


State Dept., JCS reviews completed

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Approved For Release 2002/08/28 : CIA-RDP70S00385R000100260025-6



7 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT : Senior Policy Group, Special State-Defense Study Group

As I indicated at lunch Wednesday, I am very happy to accept your invitation to join the Senior Policy Group of the Special State-Defense Study Group. I wish to name Dr. R. J. Smith, CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, as my representative on the Study Directorate of the SSDSG.

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs /s/ R. J. Smith

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Date

O/DDI: [] sfc (6 April 1967)

Distribution:

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
1 - State-Defense Study Group File

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ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Original to be Filed In _____ Decentralized Files.

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FILE DESIGNATION

CA-7778

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : ADDIS ABABA, ADEN, ASMARA, ALGIERS, AMMAN, ANKARA, ATHENS, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, DHAHRAN, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, KABUL, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, LONDON, MOGADISCIO, MOSCOW, PARIS, RABAT, RAWALPINDI, SANAA, TAIZ, TEL AVIV, TEHRAN, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, NEW DELHI

FROM : Department of State (G/PM)

DATE: **Apr 11 1 48 PM '67**

SUBJECT : Special State-Defense Study of Near East, North Africa and Horn of Africa

REF :

1. The Special State-Defense Study Group (SSDSG) is now engaged in a long range study of the Near East, North Africa and the Horn of Africa at the request of the Senior Policy Group, composed of DOD Deputy Secretary Vance, JCS Chairman General Wheeler and Deputy Under Secretary of State Kohler. Retired Ambassador Julius C. Holmes has been appointed on a consultant basis as full-time director of the SSDSG for this study. His deputy is Brigadier General Stephen W. Henry, USAF. Members of the SSDSG have been drawn from the three military services, the Department of State and CIA.

2. Enclosed for your information are the terms of reference for the study, approved by the Senior Policy Group on March 29, 1967. The focus of the study will be on long range developments rather than on suggestions for resolution of current crises. Arguments in favor of the latter were weighed. However, the group believed that such a shorter-range view would involve much duplication of the efforts of other government agencies which are already capably accomplishing short and medium term analyses. The SSDSG is in a unique position to examine longer range trends and variables from an inter-agency viewpoint, with the expectation of reflecting the shape of the future more usefully than would a crisis-oriented study with its requirements to accommodate to potentially transitory developments.

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FORM 4-63 DS-323

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☐ In ☒ Out

Drafted by: SSDSG/GCMoore/G/PM/LBrown/v1

Drafting Date: 4/6/67

Contents and Classification Approved by: G/PM - Jeffrey E. Kitchen

Clearances: SSDSG - Amb. Holmes (in draft) NEA - Mr. Sober
INR /DDR - Mr. Evans

AF/AFI:WPOnell

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2.

3. Among the broad fields which the study will consider are the inter-workings of dynamic political and social movements in the region, expected shifts in military and strategic requirements of the powers concerned, and the impact of foreseeable technological developments on the interests of the United States and other countries. The objective will be to offer concise evaluations of major long-term trends to serve as practical guidance for those making daily action decisions.
4. During the period of the study, tentatively expected to be completed by mid-summer, the SSDSG will welcome addressees comments and suggested input, preferably forwarded through normal reporting channels. While limitations of time preclude sending the draft to the field for comments, portions of it may be sent to selected posts.
5. Although the appointment of Ambassador Holmes to direct a study on "Middle East and Africa Problems" was announced by the Department on March 1 (see Department Circular 163537 for press guidance) we contemplate no further publicity. The study should not be discussed with host country officials or non-US Embassies, except as provided for in the reference circular.

KATZENBACH, ACTING

Enclosure: Terms of Reference

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29 March 1967

TERMS OF REFERENCE

3

for a

STUDY OF THE AREA EMBRACING THE NEAR EAST, NORTH AFRICA
AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

to be conducted by

THE SPECIAL STATE-DEFENSE STUDY GROUP

A. Purpose

The purpose of this study is to develop perspectives on how the US can best promote its national interests, in view of the discernible trends and variables, through an area encompassing the Near East, the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa.* The roles of adjacent areas and other nations--with particular emphasis on the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and Communist China--will be examined to the degree necessary to develop an assessment of their involvement in the region under study. The study will cover the period 1967-1972 but may project further into the future if the Group believes this would illuminate particular problems.

B. Scope and Approach

The focus of the effort will be on an evaluation of US interests and policy objectives and their interaction with the interests of other powers and with the plausible evolution of forces and trends within the area. It will distinguish between primary and lesser interests of the United States and of hostile powers, particularly the Soviet Union. It will identify threats to our interests and will analyze the means available to us and to friendly powers for meeting these threats. It will evaluate the utility of our commitments.

From this analysis in depth the Group will evaluate long-term developments through 1972 respecting both our interests and regional trends. Its aim will be to provide principles and guidance for the use of policy makers that would be relevant to US problems in the area through the period under study.

*Countries included are: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, United Arab Republic, Sudan, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, Somalia, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Persian Gulf States, Muscat and Oman, and the South Arabian States.

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The analysis will seek fresh perspectives for US policy initiatives.

(4)

C. Main Lines of Inquiry

The Study Group's examination will include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

1. A definition of US interests in the area and their relation to the interests of other Western powers.
2. An evaluation of the threat to US and Western interests, posed by the capabilities and intentions of the Soviets and Chinese Communists to advance their own objectives.
3. An estimate of the impact on US interests of various intra-regional forces and movements.
4. A consideration of the effect of technological and resource changes upon US interests.
5. An assessment of:
 - a. the current US role in the area, its commitments and means for meeting them,
 - b. the declining UK role in the area, in terms of its interests, commitments and means, as exemplified by the impending withdrawal from Aden,
 - c. the roles of other major powers in the area,
 - d. the military significance of the area,
 - e. military considerations that will affect the ability of the US, Western Powers and the Soviet Union to support their respective policies in the area,
 - f. the desirability of bilateral or multilateral security arrangements for the area,
 - g. the desirability of bilateral or multilateral economic arrangements for the area,
 - h. economic trends in the area and the relevance of external aid,
 - i. the desirability and degree of US and Western military assistance to internal security and national defense forces and its impact on area arms races,

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(5)

- j. potential nuclear arms proliferation,
- k. the Arab "traditional"- "progressive" confrontation,
- l. the internal stresses imposed upon the entire region by the challenges of modernism,
- m. the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

D. Administration

These terms of reference are intended as a guide in focusing the efforts of the Study Group. Because of the broad scope of the study, selectivity must be exercised in determining those facets of the total problem that require the most intensive investigation.

Accordingly, these terms should not be regarded as rigidly constraining the form or organization of the report. Any major proposals for change in organization or emphasis in the above terms will, however, be referred to the Senior Policy Group for approval.

The Director of the SSDSG will propose a completion date to the Senior Policy Group after a working outline is structured but in any event within one month. Interim progress reports will be submitted periodically by the Director to the Senior Policy Group by informal memoranda.

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File

3 April 1967

PLANNING MEMORANDUM #2

SUBJECT: Initial Task Assignments

1. Following are the tentative assignments of responsibility for developing structure, levies for externally produced supporting papers and drafts--keyed to the working outline dated 3 April. This does not preclude participation by staff members not listed under a particular topic. All are invited and expected to contribute in any area where they have specific knowledge and ideas.

CHAPTER

I-B.	Israel - A Special Case	<u>Moore</u>	
II-A-2.	CHICOM Interests & Policies	<input type="checkbox"/>	✓ 25X1A
II-B.	Non-Communist Interests and Policies	<u>Wagner</u> Davenport	
III-A,B & C	Environmental Setting		
	1. General		
	2. Maghreb	<u>Lewis</u>	
	3. Near East	<u>Moore</u>	
		<input type="checkbox"/>	✓
	4. Horn of Africa	<u>Wagner</u>	25X1A

(All hands will contribute)

ANNEXES:

A.	Commitment...to the Security...	<u>Lewis</u>
B.	Military Strategic Appraisal	<u>Gen. Henry</u> <u>Davenport</u> Nichols Komorowski Fielder
C.	Military Assistance (political and economic implications)	<u>Moore</u> Nichols Westfall Komorowski
D.	The Soviet Role	<u>Siscoe</u> Fielder

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E.	Economic Trends and Prospects	25X1A	<input type="checkbox"/>	✓
			Wagner	
			Westfall	
F.	Petroleum	25X1A	<input type="checkbox"/>	✓
G.	Technological Development	25X1A	<input type="checkbox"/>	✓
			Komorowski	
			Westfall	

_____ Lead responsibility

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3 April 1967

Second Draft

OUTLINE
SSDSG MIDDLE EAST STUDY

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INTRODUCTION

- Purpose

The purpose of this study is to develop perspectives through 1972 on how the United States can best promote its national interests in view of the trends and variables in the area encompassing the Near East, the Maghreb, and the Horn of Africa. The analysis will comprise a study of our national interests and their interaction with those of other nations. It will evaluate existing US objectives and commitments, identify major problems, outline initiatives open to the US, and make suitable recommendations.

- Geographic Scope

The study focuses primarily on the region extending from Iran westward to the Atlantic. It encompasses Iran and Israel, the Arab Near East including the Red Sea Basin and Persian Gulf, and the Maghreb and Horn of Africa.* The roles of adjacent areas and other nations--with particular emphasis on the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and Communist China--are examined to the degree necessary to develop an assessment of their influence and involvement in the region of primary emphasis.

*Countries included are: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, United Arab Republic, Sudan, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, Somalia, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Persian Gulf states, Muscat and Oman, and the South Arabian states.

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CONFIDENTIAL- Assumptions

The study makes four assumptions for the five year period.

- a. There will be no general war.
- b. The Vietnam situation will stabilize sometime before the end of the five year period.
- c. Present total U.S. economic and military resources available for commitment abroad will not be greatly reduced during this period.
- d. The U.S. will continue to be concerned for the security of Israel.

- Methodology

(sources, means of obtaining information, method of approach)

I. U. S. INTERESTSA. Analysis of U.S. Interests and Objectives

- Prevent any conflict in the area from leading to World War III.
- Maintain necessary access and conditions of use for operational facilities and for lines of communication, both military and commercial.
- Maintain free world access to oil supplies on acceptable terms.
- Preserve an acceptable degree of intra-regional stability so as to mitigate the possibility of armed conflicts threatening our foregoing primary interests. If such conflicts occur, take suitable measures to eliminate or contain them.
- Prevent if possible, but at least minimize or contain, the expansion of Communist or other hostile control or influence in the area.
- Insure reasonable access to markets for US commerce and protection for US private investments.

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- Promote orderly economic, social and political development within the region so as to encourage long-term stability and progress.
- Deny to any elements in the area enough influence over US policy determinations seriously to limit our flexibility of action.

(Discussion of U.S. current interests and objectives in the area, their relative importance and priority and any presently foreseeable developments which might alter their importance. Why do we care about the area? What situations are we trying to bring about? Which interests are vital and which might be subject to change? How might these interact with our world-wide interests?)

B. Israel--A Special Case

II. INTERESTS AND POLICIES OF OTHER NON-REGIONAL POWERS IN THE AREA

A. Communist

1. U.S.S.R.

- Prevent any conflict in the area from leading to World War III.
- Promote Soviet influence and the establishment of allied or friendly regimes, subject to the requirement that stresses and conflicts arising remain sufficiently limited so as not to provoke a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.
- Promote Russia's strategic and commercial interest in Middle Eastern oil.
- Gain assured use of lines of communication, including port facilities.
- Deny or limit free world access to lines of communication and military operational facilities.
- Spread the Russian brand of Communism, to enhance Soviet influence in the world and among Communist countries.

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2. Communist Chinese

Aid and encourage radical nationalist groups and regimes which seem to confront reactionary and imperialist elements, in furtherance of the Maoist revolutionary doctrine and of China's influence in the world and among Communist countries.

Develop clients who will support China's traditional territorial claims and international status before the United Nations and elsewhere.

3. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia

4. Others if necessary

B. Non-Communist

1. United Kingdom

2. France

3. W. Germany, Italy, Spain, Pakistan

4. Others

(See note in I above and expand to include analysis of present programs and activities in the area and prospects for change)

III. ENVIRONMENTAL SETTINGA. Current National Postures, Purposes and CapabilitiesWithin the Region

1. General Perspective

2. Maghreb

3. Near East

4. Horn of Africa

(The following topics will be dealt with to the degree appropriate in the context of each of the above regions.)

a. Political

The area's and individual countries': political integrity; current national posture, objectives and capabilities; political alignments with regional and

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extra-regional countries; disputed boundaries; area blocs; Nationalism; Socialism; quality and quantity of leadership; opposition, tolerated and suppressed; determination of consent among the people; traditionalists vs. progressives.

b. Economic

Natural resources; employment; foreign investments; agriculture; dependence on foreign aid; water resources and irrigation; industrial progress; technological progress and aspirations; trade; viability and vitality.

c. Social

Modernization and social reforms; urbanization; education; religion; labor unions and other sub-government organs; commercial, artisan and professional classes.

d. Military

The organs of external and internal security; patterns of traditional and modern military strengths and capabilities; loyalties; political affiliations and role of military leadership; impact of external military assistance, training and other support.

e. Regional Conflicts and Issues

B. Checklist of Present and Likely Crisis Points

(Recapitulation)

C. Likely Developments, 1967-72

(Discuss as appropriate under some or all of the same topics as in III. A.)

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.

(In light of discussion preceding, what are the major problems and threats likely to be faced by the U.S. through the period and beyond?)

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V. U. S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

- A. Current Strategy
- B. Appraisal of Alternatives
- C. Means of Effective Shifts and Pursuing New Concepts

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. The Preferred Strategy through 1972 and its Longer-run Implications

ANNEXES

- A. Commitment of U.S. and Other Powers to the Security of Nations in the Area (formal and informal)
 - U.S.
 - U.K.
 - France
 - USSR
 - Other
- B. Military Strategic Appraisal (by sub-regions as in III A.)
 - Military significance of the region to the U.S. (for possible regional and general military operations).
 - Military significance of the region to the USSR and Western powers.
 - Appraisal of national military capabilities (include MAP, U.S. and others, but only military implications).
 - Appraisal of U.S. and other capabilities
 - Factors affecting future abilities of U.S., western powers, USSR, to apply military force (communications, bases, infrastructure, mobility, nuclear proliferation, access rights, intelligence facilities, etc.)
- C. Military Assistance (U.S. and others--political and economic implications)
 - Pattern and impact of arms acquisition
 - MAP as an avenue to leadership cadres

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D. The Soviet Role

(Comprehensive analysis of Soviet interests, objectives, capabilities, programs, influence and likely intentions in the area and an assessment of US-Soviet relations as they may develop through 1972).

E. Economic Trends and Prospects

(Not excluding oil but reserving detailed considerations for Annex F)

- Economic concentration, diversification and development: present efforts, likely results, problems.
- Agrarian patterns: soil and water, likely impact of technological change, limitations, what might speed or impede.
- International commerce: trade patterns, likely developments.
- Regional economic cooperation: patterns and prospects.
- The role of external aid.

F. Petroleum

- Position of Middle East oil in world economic picture
- Use, access, alternatives
- Significance to West, Communist countries, regional countries: prospective changes

G. Impact of Technological Development (on factors affecting the internal regional situation)

- Adaptation to the area of common Western technology
- Nuclear Energy
- Desalinization
- Communications
- Others

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DDI - 955-07

29 MAR 1967

7-1142

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General D. M. Spivey
Acting Director, Joint Staff
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: State-Defense Study Group Middle East
Project

To meet the needs outlined in your letter of 7 March, I have named [] as the CIA member of the State-Defense Study Group working on the problems of the Middle East. [] will be CIA's internal coordinator for the project and will serve as Mr. [] alternate when required. Both officers have extensive background and experience in this area which should contribute greatly to your study.

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/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

cc: Ambassador Julius C. Holmes

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CONCUR:

Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence

21 MAR 1967

Date

CONCUR:

SIGNED

Deputy Director for Plans

28 MAR 1967

Date

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O/BDI [] (21 March 1967)

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
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THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301



7 March 1967

The Honorable Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Dick:

The Special State-Defense Study Group is undertaking a study of problems in the Middle East. This appears to be a logical successor study to the Long-Range Communist China Study of last year. Ambassador Julius C. Holmes has been designated Study Director for the project with Brigadier General Stephen W. Henry, USAF, serving as his deputy. Terms of reference are now being assembled for approval by the Senior Policy Group.

The Study Group will have a continuing need for CIA support, such as was provided during the China Study, by a full-time representative, consultations, and other assistance by specific sections of the Agency.

Ambassador Holmes will be in contact with you in the near future.

Sincerely,

B. E. SPIVY
Lt General, USA
Acting Director
Joint Staff

Copies to:
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

100-1047

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

Long Range Study on the

INDIAN OCEAN AREA

(An examination of the politico-military factors affecting long range (1967-1977) US interests in the area of the Indian Ocean and its environs)

A. The Problem

The Study Group will examine the effect on U.S. security interests in the area* of (1) externally based threats (Chinese Communist, Soviet or other potentially hostile or disruptive efforts to bring power to bear in the area) and (2) intra-regional sources of discord and violence (both between countries or groupings of countries in the area and within individual countries in the area). It will assess possible requirements for bringing U.S. capabilities, both non-military and military, to bear effectively in the area, the possible role of India as a counterbalance to Asian Communist power, probable changes in British political and military presence and capabilities in the area, possible expansion of Australian and other allied participation in regional security responsibilities, and the availability of bases in and access to the area.

B. Scope and Approach

The Study Group will attempt to arrive at a definitive

*For purposes of this study the area includes the Indian Ocean and the countries bordering on the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. It will encompass the East Coast of Africa and West Coast of Australasia, only to the extent that these areas have an impact on the projection of military power into the central portion of the Indian Ocean area.

WORKING PAPER SECRET

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statement of U.S. interests in the area under consideration. In light of these interests, it will consider ways in which plausible political, economic, and military developments might affect the aims, policies and freedom of action of the United States and its allies.

In view of the vast size of the area under consideration, the Study Group may find it desirable to organize at least part of the analysis on the basis of sub-regional grouping of countries, with principal emphasis on (1) the sub-continent and (2) the Arabian Sea - Persian Gulf area, and with less intensive attention to the "flanks" of the Indian Ocean.

The Study Group should focus its main efforts on isolating those problem areas that appear likely to pose the most important challenges to U.S. interests, and in proposing approaches to dealing with these problems.

C. Main Lines of Inquiry

The Study Group's main lines of inquiry should include but need not be limited to the following:

1. A description of U.S. interests in the area and an evaluation of their importance in relation to U.S. interests in other major regions.
2. An assessment of the threats, both external and intra-regional, to U.S./Free World interests.

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3. A description and assessment of the U.S. role in the area, in terms of commitments and resources (including military forces and bases) for meeting those commitments.

4. An assessment of the UK role in the area, in terms of interests, commitments and resources, compatibility with the U.S. role, and impact on U.S. interests of probable changes in the British role.

5. An assessment of the roles of other principal potential powers in the area (e.g. India, Australia, Arab groupings).

6. An assessment of the feasibility and desirability of bilateral or multilateral security arrangements for the area.

7. An assessment of base facilities and military forces required by U.S. (or U.S. and allied) interests.

8. An examination of nuclear problems: proliferation, nuclear guarantees, U.S. and UK nuclear deployments.

D. Recapitulation

A summary of principal conclusions and recommendations, highlighting issues and opportunities for U.S. policy.

E. Administration

1. These terms of reference are intended as a guide in focusing the initial efforts of the Study Group. Because of the very broad scope of the subject matter, both geographically and functionally, it will be essential to be selective in determining those facets of the total problem

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that require the most intensive investigation and the heaviest investment of working time.

2. Accordingly, these terms of reference should not be regarded as rigidly constraining the form or organization of the report. The Study Group should, however, refer to the Senior Policy Group for approval any major proposals for change in organization or emphasis in the thrust of the above outline, preferably within two months after commencing the Study.

3. The Study will be completed within nine months of approval of these terms of reference or assembly of the Study Group, whichever is later. Interim progress reports will be submitted to the Senior Policy Group as appropriate.

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